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OF BULLDOGS AND SOAPY SAMS: THE
COMMON LAW AND EVOLUTIONARY
THEORY
Allan C. Hutchinson and Simon Archer*
Ronald Dworkin: '[Pragmatism] is philosophically a dog's dinner.' Richard Posner:
'I take it [Dworkin] does not much like dogs.' Ronald Dworkin: 'As it happens, I like
dogs very much.'

Richard Posner: 'As a cat person, I am disappointed. I hope I will be forgiven for
having thought him distinctly feline.'1

The venue-the annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement
of Science in Oxford's newly built Museum of Natural History-and the occasion-a
lecture on European social development by a relatively unknown American
scholar, Dr John William Draper-were fairly unremarkable. But the unscheduled
debate that followed, although much anticipated by the unprecedented and
eminent 700 in attendance, has become the fabled stuff of historical moment.
Occurring on Saturday 30 June 1860, only six months after the publication of
Charles Darwin's On The Origin of Species, the face-off over the controversial
theory of evolution by natural selection was between the conservative and
sceptical Bishop of Oxford, 'Soapy Sam' Wilberforce, and the uncompromising
scientist and leading public intellectual of the day, Thomas Henry 'Bulldog'
Huxley. While the topic was supposed to be the subtle scientific implications of
Darwin's evolutionary account, the agenda was much broader and more polarized;
it pitted the established church order against an emerging scientific new wave.
In so doing, this Victorian debate set the tone and terms for lengthy intellectual
debate about evolution and much more over the next century and a half. For all
its imputed sophistication and scholarliness, parts of contemporary jurisprudence
*
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have come to exhibit the melodramatic and vindictive quality of that famous
Oxford debate. Ronald Dworkin and Richard Posner's recent exchanges not only
resonate with similar tart rhetoric, but their substantive positions have uncanny
resemblances to those of Soapy Sam and the Bulldog.
Those resemblances can be found in their respective positions within the
'evolutionary paradigm' for explaining the development of the common law. This
paradigm has a 200-year history in accounts of common law traditions and
development, and has become increasingly sophisticated in the past twenty-five
years. We have picked out Dworkin and Posner because they have well known
and perhaps representative views

for two

common

positions

within this

paradigm, but the offerings are rich for those with an interest in subspecies,
precursors, and filiation. We will assess one of the deeper jurisprudential
differences that separate Dworkin and Posner: their respective stances on the
tradition of the common law, especially its operation and development. While on
the face of it both sides view the legal process and adjudication as distinctly human
enterprises, they disagree profoundly over whether this enterprise is better
understood in the philosophical cast of natural law or in the social-scientific
terminology of 'efficient' decision-making. Whereas Dworkin insists that law must
be understood as a site for abstract and coherent reflection on the moral basis of
the good society, Posner contends that law is less about theory and more about
facts in that judges should do whatever is most useful in the particular social
circumstances. It is presented as a case of the soapy moralist against the
bulldoggish pragmatist. For one, adjudication is being driven by some moral
force that is much bigger and better than any single judge; for the other, the judge
is an adaptionist agent for society's struggle for survival. However, on closer
inspection neither combatant's position is quite what it appears to be. Both
Dworkin and Posner have, if you will, a Creationist flavour, in that they each fall

back on the discredited idea that there is one particular truth to law that does or
should transcend all others and that there is one method for elucidating and
perpetuating that truth.
Whatever the differences between Dworkin and Posner, we suggest that both
they and a good portion of theorizing on evolution-and-law employ that
paradigm at serious risk to their projects, because in our reading they import a
contradiction central to their propositions through the analogy to evolutionary
theory. This is that, even if change in the common law occurs through some sort
of natural selection akin to that proposed by Darwinian evolution, the mechanism
by which change operates in evolutionary theory, the transmission of genetic
material, has been characterized as chance-like, random, or even the site of
'mistakes' in replication. We suspect that this insight from evolution is not central
to either Dworkin's nor Posner's views on common law. But we do contend that
any analogy to evolution must cope with this particular aspect of that analogy, as
being one of two core elements that describe and explain change and
development. Perhaps in reaction to this threat, writers within the evolution and
law paradigm have generated a number of much more sophisticated responses
or amendments to the basic analogy employed or implied by Posner and
Dworkin. Part of this chapter traces attempts to cope with exactly that sort of
indeterminacy in open systems.
But our dominant ambition in this paper is to flush out the lingering
theological traces that clog up Dworkin's approach and that also pushes through
on the pragmatic aspirations of Posner's initiative. In short, we wish to clarify the

political implications of much of the evolution-as-law paradigm through a
comparison of Posner and Dworkin's place within it. While Posner is correct to
chastise Dworkin for the divine intimations of his philosophical theorizing, he
fails to heed the radical import of his own pragmatic critique. Similarly,

although Dworkin is correct to come down hard on Posner for the disingenuous
modesty of his pragmatic perspective, he wastes the opportunity to put his own
abstract house into working order. Our intervention seeks to demonstrate law's
pragmatic character at the same time that it confirms adjudication's political
quality. We

also spend time discussing

some

aspects

and

history

of

evolutionary theory as it pertains to our argument. As such, this paper is
divided into five parts. In the first part we sketch the initial terms of
engagement over Darwin in the scientific community; the emphasis is on
mapping the territory, not on mining it, and on suggesting the components of a
common-that is non-specialist discourse of evolution. The second section explores
the different ways in which the evolutionary insight has found its way into legal
studies and associated claims to enhance an appreciation of law's historical
development. In the third section we focus on the contributions of Dworkin and
Posner around the relevance of evolutionary thinking to law; the point is to
show, not so much that they are of little value, for they are not, but that they
overreach themselves in making the claims that they do. In the final section we
make modest proposals for the construction of legal traditions, their change and
development. Throughout the essay, as well as confining ourselves to a largely
descriptive brief, we emphasize that the jurisprudential challenge is more to
explain change than to explain stability and that no change is good or bad in itself,
but will depend on the context. By way of conclusion we recognize that, when
it comes to law and adjudication, evolution is as much a responsibility as it is a
necessity.

Terms of Engagement
After Draper's lacklustre and forgettable lecture on 'The Intellectual Development of

Europe Considered with Reference to the Views of Mr. Darwin', Bishop Wilberforce
took the floor. As expected, he gave a powerful, if over-wrought renunciation of
Darwin's theory; he was not known as Soapy Sam for nothing. Briefed by Robert
Owen, one of Darwin's fiercest scientific critics, he lambasted the evolutionary
initiative and restated the Creationist case. Echoing the words of his yet-to-bepublished review of the Origin, Wilberforce made sport with Darwin and his earnest
defenders. After noting Darwin's apparent observations about 'our unsuspected
cousinship with mushrooms', he asked 'is it credible that, even if transmutations were
rapidly occurring, all favourable varieties of turnips are tending to become men?'2 At
the end of his rather bombastic harangue, Wilberforce turned to Huxley, who was
sitting close by him, and said 'I should like to ask Professor Huxley who is about to
tear me to pieces when I sit down, as to his belief in being descended from an ape. Is
it on his grandfather's or his grandmother's side that the ape ancestry comes in?' As
Huxley stood up to speak the tension was high. But the normally snappy and
high-strung Huxley managed to muzzle his bulldog tendencies. Turning to his
neighbour, Sir Benjamin Brodie, the Queen's surgeon, he whispered 'the Lord have
delivered him into my hands'.
In a deft stroke of gamesmanship, Huxley replied: 'I should feel it no shame to
have risen from such an origin, but I should feel it a shame to have sprung from
one who prostituted the gifts of culture and eloquence to the service of
prejudice and falsehood.' At the time, this was strong stuff and a member of the
audience, Lady Brewster, fainted at hearing a Bishop so publicly denounced. But
the debate was not finished. Several noted members of the audience rose to
speak, including a bible-brandishing Robert Fitzroy, Darwin's former friend and
captain of the Beagle ship on which Darwin had made his fateful trip some
thirty years before, who denounced Darwin as a heretic and an apostate. The
final speaker was Joseph Hooker, the Director of the Royal Botanical Gardens

at Kew; he had his own political as well as scientific reasons for championing
the Darwinian cause. In contrast to the fevered interventions that preceded his,
Hooker wisely made a less emotional and more learned riposte to Wilberforce's
assault. Although less memorable than Huxley's verbal fireworks, his hard-hitting
arguments against Wilberforce probably did more for the longer term benefit of
the Darwinian cause: 'facts in this science which before were inexplicable to me
became one by one explained by [Darwin's] theory, and conviction has been thus
gradually forced upon an unwilling convert.'3

By most accounts, a rampant Huxley and the scientific academy won the day
over a chagrined Wilberforce and his clerical enthusiasts. However, as the
intervening decades have revealed, Creationism is not so easily vanquished.
Moreover, the 'scientific cause' has not always been helped by the fact that many
of those who claim to be inspired by Darwin's work have pursued their own
supposedly secular theories with an orthodox zeal that would embarrass all but
the most devoted cleric. In the hands of such evolutionary fundamentalists,
Darwinism becomes 'a world view that encompasses the hierarchically related
concepts of change, order, direction, progress, and perfectability'. 4 However, as the
Oxford quarrel suggests, there is much more at stake in discussing Darwin than a
recherche biological theorem. Whatever else it is, science is never only science,
and the difference between science and other pursuits is much less stark than is
generally conceded: 'the negotiations [between working scientists] as to what
counts as a proof or what constitutes a good assay are no more or less orderly
than any argument between lawyers and politicians.' 5 In the case of Darwin, the
stakes are so high because it provides some propositions about core questions of
human existence where did it all begin, how did we get here from there, and

perhaps even what can we do about the future-and to do so with the authority of
a scientific theory. Along with Isaac Newton and Albert Einstein, Darwin is
considered one of the greatest scientists ever: his work has not only changed the
way that scientists go about their work, but has affected the way people think
about the world and their place in it.6 As such, 'Darwin' has come to represent
something apart from the historical person and published words of Charles
Darwin. Indeed, what Darwin did and did not mean is much less important than
what can be said about evolution in the light of Darwin's writings against and
within a context of twenty-first-century science and sensibilities.
Nonetheless, insofar as there is something that has come to be called a
Darwinian account of evolution, it deserves to be distinguished and rescued
from the spectrum of derivative theoretical offerings that are more Darwinistic
than Darwinian. It is tantamount to fundamentalism to claim that something is
or is not true simply because Darwin did or did not say it. It is better to view
Darwin's theory as a launching pad for various ideas about the phenomenon of
change and development in the natural world. As Steve Jones has irreverently
put it, 'evolution is a political sofa that molds itself to the buttocks of the last to
sit upon it'.7
In the sense of a discourse of evolution that we are constructing, evolution
is a variant of the doctrine of progress. It can be traced to the Greeks, of
whom Aristotle offered the most compelling ideas about the continuity and
developing nature of all living things. In the intervening centuries it appeared in
many different incarnations. Yet the common thread to most offerings was that
there was some notion of progress at work in which the world was not simply
on the move, but was heading towards some sophisticated end-point, be it
theological in plan or purpose. Moreover, it was maintained that there was a
hierarchical arrangement to nature which placed humans at its apex. By the

early nineteenth century, when Darwin took his trip on HMS Beagle to the
Galapagos Archipelago, the prevailing wisdom among biologists was the
Lamarckian notion that individuals adapt to their environment and that those
altered characteristics are inherited by that individual's progeny. Darwin took
this attractive suggestion and turned it on its head.8 He got the basic idea in
1838 that: 'in the struggle for existence . . . favourable variations would tend
to be preserved and unfavourable ones to be destroyed.'9 After over twenty
more years of experiment and reflection, Darwin published his revolutionary

Origin of Species in 1859. In this attempt to present a 'long catalogue of facts',
Darwin's revolutionary contribution was manifold-to suggest how that process
worked, how seemingly different species are related, how evolution was not
planned or inevitable, and how Homo sapiens was not only related to more
primitive life-forms, but also

was not the

necessary outcome of the

evolutionary process. Accordingly, Darwin did not so much introduce the idea
of evolution as develop a particular version of evolution and a view on the
particular mechanism by which evolution occurs. Conceding that nature had
the appearance of being designed by some grand and benevolent hand, he
nevertheless demonstrated that the apparent design was the relentless result
of chance; a designing deity is displaced by the impression of one that does not
actually exist. Although Darwin's work is densely packed with his amassed
evidence and supporting argumentation, the central thesis of On The Origin of

Species is perhaps simple if entirely innovative. Several ideas are blended
together explaining a large pool of data-the fossil record-which combine to
suggest a sort of dynamic of evolution. He selects examples on which to hang
his argument-leading in quietly, with a discussion of domestication-and
manages to construct hypotheses that would explain all examples

of

evolution, all 'instances' of the fossil record that could be pointed to as

'proof'. It is a remarkable effect.
When listed, the conceptual building-blocks might run as follows. Organisms
create more offspring than can survive. In procreating these offspring, mutations
occur, randomly it was suspected, and are as likely to be detrimental as beneficial
to the organism, or to be neutral with respect to survival chances. They do not
result, as Lamarck had insisted, as a designed function of willed adaptation.10
Those mutated offspring which are able to survive a given environment will have
better chances of living to reproduce, and possibly pass along their 'mutuations'.
Over time and across populations, these variations will accumulate; new
characteristics and even species will develop and some species will disappear.
Darwin called this process 'natural selection'. He suspected that there is no
predetermined path or design to evolutionary development, but could not know,
and developed his argument so as to suggest this. His work makes it clear that
he had little tolerance for the view that evolution was either a purifying Platonic
process in which variant forms are eliminated so that a species' true being can
assert itself or a Panglossian process in which everything happens for the best.
Although quantitative change will ultimately result in qualitative difference,
evolution is basically the long process through which natural selection works on
genetic variations. To say more than this about Darwin's basic evolutionary thesis
is to court controversy. But these are, we suggest, the basics of the mainstream
appreciation of the theory of evolution. In a twist of historical appreciation,
Darwin's work has come to be treated as much more, as having political, ethical,
and even religious significance. The struggle to claim the origin and descent of
Darwinian evolutionary thought for a particular political, ethical, or religious
campaign has gone on unabated.
Legal scholars have never been afraid to join the battle. We have chosen to
divide those initiatives and interpretations into three general groups, the

Darwinians, the Creationists, and the neo-Darwinians, for the purposes of our
analysis. The next sections outline the basic positions in evolutionary theory,
which are tracked by positions in legal thinking about common law development.
Given a little bit of time to acclimatize and update, Bulldog Huxley and Soapy
Sam Wilberforce would soon be at home in contemporary debates over the
meaning, significance, and reach of evolution. It is Darwin who might be more
disturbed at the turn that events have taken, but no less fascinated.
There is a significant group who hold to a fairly traditional understanding of
Darwin's ideas. Within this Darwinian camp there are positions that differ on
questions left open by Darwin. However, they generally turn on differing
emphases in their explanations rather than on fundamental assumptions. There is
some division over the pace of evolution: whether evolution proceeds at a steady
and gradual rate, or by stages of punctuated equilibrium in which change
happens in geologically brief speciation events separated by long periods of
stasis, and secondly, on the 'level' at which evolution occurs: the strictly
genetic, or the interplay of factors at several levels in the organism's
existence.11 This traditional account, with its modern variations or debates, is
the well-spring for most analogies between law and evolution and, we suggest, the
most ubiquitous metaphor or analogy made in mainstream accounts of common
law development.
While there are still those who believe in a Genesis-inspired account of
creation, there is a new Creationist approach that seeks to blend science and
theology.12 Not only do they assert that evolutionary accounts are wrong because
God or some higher being is ultimately the hand behind creation, but also these
Creationist scholars argue that Darwinism is unsubstantiated on the facts, ill
conceived as scientific method, and mischievously biased. Moreover, mindful
that available evidence of events over millions of

years is limited and

impressionistic, they insist that their own approach is as plausible as any other.
Exploiting gaps and uncertainties in the fossil record, or the ability of Darwinian
models to account for 'irreducibly complex' organisms, they suggest that God is
to be found in the details of 'intelligent design' which characterize evolution, and
whose purpose and direction is divine but unknowable. We will suggest that a
popular view of common law development, perhaps most robustly expressed in
ideas of natural law, partakes quite readily of this Creationist discourse. We return
to this comparison below.
The second group of dissidents from traditional Darwinism are the neoDarwinians. This motley troop can again be subdivided into so-called social
Darwinians and ultra-Darwinians. The former cannot resist putting Darwin's
theorizing to prescriptive effect in a wide array of human affairs; the latter want to
utilize it to reductionist ends. At their crudest, the social Darwinians persist in
claims that poor people are poor because they are less fit or that race or gender
are determinative of various social capacities. The unifying goal of these social
Darwinians is to offer a prescriptive dimension for future human progress:
individual struggle becomes both the engine and the engineer of good social
organization. Huxley was eventually to belong to this camp.13 As a normative
initiative, it cannot simply be posited as a fact of nature because this assumes
what is the major bone of contention in ethical and political inquiry; 'facts' and
'nature' are contested categories.The other neo-Darwinians are the ultra-Darwinians.
It is not so much that they disagree over the basic Darwinian thesis or that they see

any grand design at work, it is that they wish to extend Darwin's notion of
evolution to everything, or perhaps we could say, reduce everything to genetics.
(Although we note below that the application is more selective than it appears: this
application usually involves an emphasis on 'natural selection'.) In the same way
that flora and fauna can be said to thrive as a result of their genes' 'urge' to

survive, so human behaviour is said to be reducible to a similar dynamic.
Bracketing Darwin's rider 'I am convinced that natural selection has been the main
but not the exclusive means of modification', 14 they claim that, whereas the gene is
the basic unit of evolution and the population at large are disposable vehicles for its
survival, an entity called a meme fulfils a similar role for ideas and concepts.15 It
gets accused, in the main, of being a 'vulgar reductionism' of human affairs. As
one commentator has neatly put it, 'even if you can build a bottle from which the
desired genie emerges, you can't reduce the genie to the bottle once it's out'.16
This cautionary insight has particular salience for understanding the relevance of
Darwinian evolutionary theory to law and adjudication.

Jurisprudence and Law
We turn at last to the applications of evolution in law. The evolutionary metaphor
has always loomed over jurisprudential efforts to explicate the nature of the
common law; the work of Maine, Holmes, Wigmore, and Corbin drew heavily
on the new Darwinian paradigms of their era. However, in the past couple of
decades or so the effort to utilize evolutionary theory to illuminate legal and
jurisprudential problems

has

become

much

bolder

and

more explicit.17

Contributing to a general tendency in the humanities generally, modern jurists
have now begun to extend this scientific theory not only to explain the past of the
common law, but also to predict its present dynamic and future direction. 18
The basic task has been divided into three components: a narrative that explains
the basic material being described (i.e. case law and legal doctrine), an overall
direction or purpose to that narrative, and a mechanism which explains how
changes or development are generated. While some accounts focus on only a
couple of these components, a few seek to provide an integrated theory that

claims to tie all three together by way of a simple logic or algorithm. We noted
above that analogies to evolution tend to emphasize the 'selection' and not the
actual mechanism of change: unsurprising, because that would weaken the
analogy considerably. In jurisprudence's efforts to utilize Darwin's insights for
explaining the past history, present practice, and future direction of the common
law, the same basic intellectual divisions have taken hold. Although these
positions vary in their details and nuances, they loosely resemble the general
positions in the scientific debate. As currently understood, the main debate in
jurisprudence is dominated by the Soapy Sams on the Creationist side and the
Bulldogs on the neo-Darwinian side.
In taking this general approach, contemporary jurists participate in the
much more expansive project of the humanities which attempts to explain the
idea and history of progress through recourse to the prestigious discourse of
scientific authority. In these modernist efforts, evolutionary theory has proved
a useful and authoritative device: its advocates claim to resolve the complex
mysteries of human progress by reference to one simple formula. This is an
ambitious project, and if successful will be a truly momentous achievement in
the history of jurisprudential thought. However, fortunately or unfortunately,
this project cannot be sustained. Despite its obvious academic allure and
apparent

intellectual

pedigree,

evolutionary

theory

has little to offer

traditional efforts to understand the development and direction of the common
law. If (and this must remain a moot point) Darwin's basic insights have
anything to tell lawyers and jurists, it is that evolutionary development is a
corrosive idea that does more to undercut the grand explanatory ambitions of
mainstream jurisprudence than to ground or achieve them. Darwinians view
the world as much more make-do and makeshift than either the legal
Creationists or some of the prescriptions of neo-Darwinians allow; adaptations

are as likely to be bad as good, and as likely to be a by-product of some other
adaptive change. As often as not the Darwinian answer to the ubiquitous
question of 'what is the broader significance or purpose of something?' is
'nothing'. If this has been a hard lesson for biologists and scientists, it has been
a near impossible one for lawyers and jurists to learn and accept.
Ironically, the most potent use of the evolutionary narrative in law has been
distinctly non-Darwinian (and not infrequently anti-Darwinian) in thrust and
ambition. Evolution has most often been used as a catch-all term for general
development and change. Insofar as this usage is entirely casual, those jurists who
talk about law evolving do not analogize or seek identification with evolutionary
theory. However, not averse to trading off the hard currency of scientific
explanation, such theorists connote some aspect of systematic and directed
development in their accounts of the common law.19 In its more modest
manifestations, such normative scholarship concentrates on one particular area
of law and, in a typical boot-strapping manoeuvre, identifies an underlying
pattern or organizing principle and suggests that the legal doctrine is developing
to give it better and more coherent expression.20 In its grander form, the claim is
made that the whole of the law is moving forward in step with the beat of law's
own distinctive drum. It is contended that, although law and adjudication take
place within changing social and political conditions, these contexts are simply
occasions or opportunities for judges to reflect upon and develop law's essential
character; these contexts are not treated as the source or cause of law's changing
character. As such, these jurisprudential interventions have a rather inward and
miraculous quality to them and posit some hidden designer behind law's
development and direction: it is a much resisted, but barely disguised, form of
legal Creationism. 'What is law for?' is in many ways an ecclesiastical question.
In contrast to this dominant strain of contemporary jurisprudence, there is a

variety of scholarship that takes the Darwinian idea of evolution more seriously
and sympathetically. This reliance on evolutionary narratives ranges from extended
analogies to full-blown homologies. Viewed collectively as a series of complex
narratives describing the development of law, morality, social systems, and
biological explanations of behaviour, they seek to fuse the prestigious cache of
scientific explanation with the normative framework, imputed or asserted, of legal
systems.
This is not the place to delineate a typology of arguments deployed in the
evolution and law paradigm, but we can suggest some contours. We have
already noted that there have been two main phases, a traditional and a modern
phase of evolutionary metaphors. Within the modern phase there are several
branches exploring different emphases.
The traditional phase connotes gradualist development over time, usually
toward some goal or other as seen in hindsight. Examples include works of
Corbin, Wigmore or Holmes on common law development. Such analogies are
perhaps the most common use of evolution: those that, in the simplest of ways,
seek to present development as somehow gradual and inevitable, and at the
agency of something with law or legal thinking, that gets revealed by judges in
case law and doctrinal development. The most interesting feature is, to our
reading, the location of agency in this evolutionary analogy, in a description that
must marry change and development with some unitary coherence and unchanging
quality, it is perhaps rhetorically necessary to employ descriptive terms that can
slip between the passive and the active, or even between descriptive and
prescriptive. 21
The modern phase retreats from an explicit directedness to legal development,
or perhaps relocates it. These analogies to (and homologies with) evolutionary
theory track developments in that theory, and implications for the law and

evolution paradigm. They especially partake of developments in discourses of
'non-linear models' as applied to biology, or even outside biology. We suggest that
there are several schools within this modern phase, including: the 'updated'
traditional analogy, which might include the attempt to apply genetic models to
legal concepts via 'meme theory'; the broader

autopoeitic models,

and

Habermasian 'learning systems', which are made by explicit analogy to biological
theory; 'law-and biology' as promulgated most notably by Margaret Gruter and
her intellectual progeny, which emphasizes homological explanations between
law and biology; somewhat distinctly, 'complexity theory', 'chaos theory', and other
catch-words from non-linear modelling and analysis that attempt not so much to
analogize to another discipline as to use the techniques of modelling from that
field within or to describe 'legal fields'.22 We suspect that these models, most
often arising out of advanced mathematics, are employed as latter-day surrogates
to the Darwinian narrative, in the sense that they provide a form of 'contingent
closure' by qualitative methods, that is, by methods that describe overall
determinist systems but that cannot or do not describe individual outcomes.
Finally we feel that 'law-and-economics' must be included in this category. In
fact it may be the precursor of 'law-and-biology' in both analogy to and
homology with models of dynamic systems, complex models of human behaviour,
strong reliance on mass data, its special emphasis on econometric modelling, the
operation of a few key principles like efficiency, its historical penetration into
new disciplines, and its utter lack of predictive value.
As we have said, we are interested here in teasing out the politics of these
positions, not in providing a typology. But an increasing sophistication is
discernible in the analogies or indeed the modelling used in the evolutionary
paradigm. This includes attempts to vacate these models from any sort of purpose
or directedness, or to reframe that characterization in terms of stochastic models

including terms of art like exogenous and endogenous factors, equilibria,
variability, dynamics, and the like. Some go on to claim some 'nature' to law,
some merely assert that such analogies are good heuristic devices by which we
might understand change and development in law, and test our hypothesis.
Although these approaches differ considerably in emphasis and reach, they rely
upon some notion of Darwinian evolution. And for the purposes of this
discussion, each theorist tries but fails to avoid falling into the same temptation
that ultimately ensnared Huxley: to employ the metaphor or even the method as
proof of prescriptive propositions. A more or less random example is Robert
Clark's analysis of corporate law. He not only identifies patterns in the
development of some areas, but seems compelled to attribute them to law's
universal nature: the drift from descriptive analysis to prescriptive proposal is
almost seamless.23 Moreover, these legal Darwinians seem unable to keep the
notions of evolution and progress separate; they not only see change everywhere,
but treat progress as something that is almost inevitable. Indeed, although many
of these scholars warn against the pitfalls of a Panglossian mentality, they still
manage to put a wonderfully positive and normative gloss on law's development.
In so doing, they begin to desert the one commitment that seems to divide the
Creationist Soapy Sams from the Darwinian bulldogs: that there is no redemptive
or miraculous force that is orchestrating or driving the world forward in a
particular direction and to some preassigned destination. Looked at from a
traditional Darwinian standpoint, the legal Creationists and the neo-Darwinians
may simply be flip-sides of the same coin: they both trade in the same moral
currency and barter in the same market-place, albeit with different styles and
ambitions. There is no real role for contingency in their models, as there is
with evolutionary theory, and much of their efforts are directed at minimizing
that particular implication for law. Let us be clear: we are not insisting that there is

some close analogy between law and biology, especially over the issue of chance.
We are observing that the techniques used to persuade, that is, a form of
'contingent closure', are remarkably similar in both camps, notwithstanding their
different roots and ultimate claims.
Some will find these claims to be sweeping, and in need of substantiation.
Instead of ranging broadly and loosely over the whole of the evolutionary terrain,
we will concentrate on the work of two competing scholars whose work we have
already introduced. Whereas the work of Ronald Dworkin can fairly be used to
typify a Creationist perspective, the writings of Richard Posner can reasonably
be drawn upon to exemplify the neo-Darwinian side. Again, it is important to
be perfectly clear what we are and what we are not offering.24 Accordingly, we
suggest that, insofar as evolutionary theory has anything to say about
development in law (and it is entirely likely that it has very little to say) it tends
to support 'critical' rather than mainstream accounts of the common law; law
and adjudication are not the grounded, contained, and predictable practices that
traditional scholars postulate or imagine. We most certainly do not claim that
there is an actual Darwinian dynamic at work in the common law's development
and operation: merely that a similar rhetoric is deployed.

When Dick Met Ronnie
Although the venue has been suitably ubiquitous in this technological age, the
occasion for much of the furious and dyspeptic exchanges between Dworkin and
Posner has been the antics of President Clinton and the validity of (unsuccessful)
efforts to impeach him. Perhaps this is sufficient indication that the stakes are
lower than ever. However, like the Oxford debate between Wilberforce and
Huxley, the agenda is much broader and more polarized: it pits the established

legal order, with its metaphysics, against a 'social scientific' paradigm. Beneath
the personal invective and collateral point-scoring, there is a very significant
dispute over the nature and legitimacy of common law adjudication. Having
inherited the mantle of jurisprudential top dog from Herbert Hart, Soapy Sam
Dworkin has given eloquent and insistent voice to a naturalist jurisprudence that
obliges judges to read law's doctrinal history 'in the best light' with a belief that
the law is 'working itself pure'.25 While such noble work and suitable inspiration
may elude rank-and-file lawyers, they are not left to their own devices because,
aided by jurisprudential 'seers and prophets . . . to work out law's ambitions for
itself, the purer form of law within and beyond the law we have', their 'god is the
adjudicative principle of integrity' .26 In opposition to this frankly theological
rendering of the jurisprudential project, Bulldog Posner offers a more pragmatic
and scientific challenge that eschews all attempts to relate the worth of grand
theory to the practical operation of the adjudicative task: the law is less a
theological pilgrimage of legal faith and more a technical craft of bureaucratic
policy-making. While there is something to admire in each of these positions, there
is much more to reject. Whereas Posner is a typical lawyer who cannot resist
turning the powerful descriptive thrust of Darwinian evolution to illegitimate
prescriptive effect, Dworkin rejects entirely the critical force of evolutionary
theory and reveals that he is more the Creationist than he might otherwise think
or wish himself to be.
For Dworkin, therefore, adjudication is a philosophical adventure of the
grandest kind, in which formal integrity and abstract coherence are both the
tools and the goal of intrepid jurists. While every judge might not have the
necessary Herculean wherewithal to master the arcane equipment of philosophical
sophistication (which demands that they synthesize all the available historical
material, construct a perfectly attuned and all-embracing structure, and apply it

consistently to detailed legal problems) what is important is that judges should
do the best they can by being prepared to embark upon the 'justificatory ascent'
that might draw them into a more theoretical argument than they originally
anticipated or wanted. Maintaining that reflective height is the guarantor of
moral depth, Dworkinian judges are obliged to take a 'theory-drenched' approach,
even though they might well disagree over what that theory is and how it applies
to the dispute at hand. None the less, he assures judges and jurists that 'the
ladder of theoretical ascent is always there, on the cards, even when no one is
tempted to take even the first step up it'.27 This potent cocktail contains a
volatile brew of ethical optimism and evolutionary inevitability, which has
intoxicated many common lawyers and judges. Drinking deep at this particular
intellectual well, they are reassured that what they are doing is at the same
time politically attractive, ethically defensible, and impersonally driven. It is
standard manoeuvre for lawyers and judges to speak of the common law as if it
had an existence of its own in which there is the arcane 'invisible hand' of some
benign God-like figure at work in its unfolding and growth. For all his earthy
wit and political nous, Dworkin's jurisprudence has an entirely otherworldly
aspect, in which fundamentalist faith and sectarian devotion play a crucial role.
Soapy Sam Wilberforce would have been proud of such a religious call to
established arms.
Although this pietistic tendency to gloss the messy, episodic, and undirected
workings of the common law as a polished, integrated, and teleological process is
endemic to much contemporary jurisprudence, it is by no means universal. Many
lawyers and jurists reject such scholarly spiritualism and its claims that law has a
miraculous supra-historical life which its faithful juristic adepts can know and
understand. The idea that law is an immanent whole that transcends the
accumulated sum of its immediate parts, that there is a simple metaphysical

formula that explains

all law, and that legal practice can be rendered

philosophically pure is seen to be increasingly untenable in a world in which
lawyers and society at large are increasingly diverse in composition, interests, and
objectives. These pragmatists insist that their efforts are more grounded, less
preposterous, and thoroughly practical in aspiration and execution. Dworkin's
plea for 'justificatory ascent' to some abstract remove from which we can catch
an echo of the infinitely true and carry it back to society for people's edification and
enlightenment is exactly the wrong trip to take. Pragmatists argue that progress is
not about becoming more objective and true, about achieving justificatory height
in order to attain moral depth, nor about advancing towards some higher more
removed and abstract plane on which rationality can hold sway outside of the
disabling influence of interests, commitments, fuzziness, history, culture, and
ideology: there is no way to escape the politics of human finitude and transmigrate
to an infinite realm of pure reason that secures people against the need to make
difficult and always contestable choices. In particular, pragmatists maintain that
there are no solid and secure footings for law and legal theory that are not
themselves part of the very political and situated debate that they are intended to
ground and underwrite. In short, there is no escape from the messy and
contingent facts of social living.
The most prominent of these pragmatic critics is, of course, Richard Posner.
Once a firm believer in the truths of objectivity and integrity himself, he has
now put his prodigious energy at the service of a more pragmatic creed and
become a Darwinian bulldog who can only be ignored at lawyers' peril. He
argues that moral theory not only has little to offer law, but that it is
positively dangerous to its actual operation. A Dworkinian pilgrimage takes
judges and jurists off into the kind of ideological and indeterminate speculation
that is inimical to legitimate lawyering. Drawing explicitly on the writings of

several neo-Darwinians and in the evolutionary wake of his intellectual hero,
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, Posner recommends:
an adaptationist conception of morality, in which morality is judgednon-morally, in the
way that a hammer might be judged well or poorly adapted to its function of hammering
nails-by its contribution to the survival, or other goals, of a society.28

As such, he maintains that judges can act as evolutionary handmaidens by
facilitating rather than steering society's moral development and progress. For
Posner, this does not mean that law must be unprincipled or technocratic, only
that it is wrong to equate 'moral principle to principle, and morality to
normativity'. Instead, he concludes that what is required is that judges develop 'a
disposition to ground policy judgments on facts and consequences rather than on
conceptualisms and generalities'.29 In other words, judges and lawyers must
eschew moral philosophy for social science. In fulfilling this bureaucratic role,
Posner recommends that judges and jurists should avail themselves of the
economists' empirical tools and work to craft useful solutions to pressing and
practical controversies.
Dworkin and Posner showcase the practical implications of their jurisprudential
positions in their discussion of the Glucksberg case on the right to physician-assisted
suicide.30 For instance, Ronald Dworkin has chastised the Supreme Court for its
failure to understand fully the philosophical dimension of adjudication and the ethical
responsibilities of judges in interpreting the Constitution. Having joined with other
leading liberal philosophers (Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas
Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thomson) in submitting an amicus brief in support of the
respondents, Dworkin was not pleased with the Court's decision. This was not simply
because it found resoundingly against his particular views on the best moral and
constitutional position on assisted suicide, but because he considered that the
Judges had not properly appreciated their sophisticated task as constitutional

interpreters. Dworkin had little good to say about Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas who,
in taking an entirely historicist approach and insisting that what has been accepted as
politically fundamental is what is legally fundamental, ignored the philosophical and
critical element of constitutional adjudication; they reduced it to a crass and
conservative enterprise in empirical inquiry. On the other hand, although Souter's
judgment was 'reasonable in principle',
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Dworkin remained unconvinced that the

facts were sufficiently in dispute to warrant a hands-off approach by the courts.
Nevertheless, with characteristic ingenuity, Dworkin refused to accept that all was lost
and, arguing that five of the six Justices who wrote opinions did not reject his ethical
stance out-of-hand, hoped that the Court might come to its constitutional senses in
the future and validate a constitutional right to die.
Taking the Glucksberg bait, Richard Posner took Dworkin to task for his
mistaken views on both how the right-to-die claims should be resolved and what
valid constitutional adjudication should encompass. For Posner, Dworkin was
barking entirely up the wrong tree in insisting that such disputes require the
court to participate in moral theory; this is the problem, not the solution, in
understanding the constitutional role of courts in such ethical controversies. In
contrast, Posner is adamant that the Supreme Court must deliberately and
steadfastly refuse to become bogged down in such philosophical quagmires. His
pragmatic commitments advise that courts best fulfil their institutional roles
when they 'ground policy judgments on facts and consequences rather than on
conceptualisms and generalities'. Accordingly, in Glucksberg the Supreme Court
was correct to stay out of the moral debate around the right to die, and to prefer
the solid earth of policy analysis to the soggy turf of moral philosophy. There
was no obviously shared or objective moral resolution available; democracy was
at work and seemed to be proceeding satisfactorily without judicial interference;
and the issue demanded very complex rules of implementation which courts are

ill equipped to draft. In advocating such a consequentialist approach to
decisionmaking, Posner does not intend to abandon principled adjudication in
favour of ad hoc calculation. He claims that it is simply mistaken to equate
'moral principle to principle, and morality to normativity'.
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For Posner,

Glucksberg therefore is a prime example of the benefits and legitimacy of
construing constitutional (and general common law) adjudication as a practical
task of institutional instrumentalities rather than as an abstruse exercise in
philosophical reflection; whereas the former is something that most judges can
and should do, the latter is something that most judges cannot and should not do.
While there is much to appreciate in Posner's

pragmatic critique

of

Dworkinian-style theorizing, this audacious proposal that the empirical tools of
economists are morally neutral and ought to be adopted by judges is no less
troubling. Indeed, like the earlier Bulldog, Posner manages to subvert Darwinian
ideas in the process of championing them; he turns a valid descriptive analysis
into an illegitimate prescriptive theory. At the end of the day, by replacing
moral philosophy with social science, he is in the same theological game as
Dworkin of telling society what it should do if it wants to be a better society.
While it is true that judges and jurists would do well to take greater heed of the
sociopolitical context in which they work and of the actual consequences of their
decisions and suggestions, it is absurd to imagine that this can be done without
resort to social values or political commitments. As an empirical matter, it is
simply not the case that there is 'a fair degree of value consensus among the
judges', such that they can 'seek the best results unhampered by philosophical
doubts'.33 Whether in an ethical or scientific guise, theory cannot provide a
method that will relieve people from the responsibility and challenge of
constantly arguing and rearguing what should and should not be done in
particular contexts at particular times. Dworkin is surely right when he argues

that Posner's claims about the political process are not descriptive or technical
but moral, in the sense that they are not only judgements about how best to
achieve stipulated goals, but highly controversial claims about the distribution
and exercise of government powers and the limits imposed by respect for
individual moral rights: '[Posner] calls for the death of moral theory, but, like all
of philosophy's would-be undertakers, he only means the triumph of his own
theory.'34
While Dworkin is right to chastise Posner for drawing on values, he is
mistaken to maintain that this can only be done by buying into the kind of
theological theorizing in which Dworkin specializes. There is nothing wrong with
suggesting that 'survival of the fittest' or a related standard is a worthy goal, but
this cannot be done under cover of evolutionary theory. It simply has to be
defended like any moral or political theory. In particular, as a normative initiative,
it cannot simply be posited as a fact of nature because this assumes what is the
major bone of contention in ethical and political inquiry: what count as 'facts'
and 'nature' are contested categories. However, a sound defence does not entail the
kind of grand theorizing that Dworkin proposes. For Dworkin there is no choice
other than objective truth-'a matter of how things really are'-or subjective
opinion-'in our own breasts'. 35 Anything that does not live up to the objective
standards of truth is mere conviction, mere convention, mere ideology, etc. This
kind of either/or, all-or-nothing thinking misrepresents the possibilities. To be
against objective truth does not mean that one is left with only subjective
opinion; and to be against only subjective opinion does not imply that one is
defending the existence of objective truth. Although the traditional search for
objectivity is a lost cause, there are not only subjective opinions and relativized
truths. Instead, one truth is not as good as another if one understands by truth
nothing more than that it meets the familiar procedures of justification that

hold sway. It is not about striving to reach a promised land of truth that will
make further justification unnecessary. Instead, jurisprudence must become more
useful such that success is not vouchsafed by reliance upon a particular epistemic
method, but by the usefulness of the results arrived at and their effect upon
meeting certain objectives that are taken to be morally or politically significant:
moral choice is 'always a matter of compromise between competing goods
rather than a choice between the absolutely right and the absolutely wrong•.36
Accordingly, instead of reflecting with Dworkin upon universality to justify
particular principles (which will turn out anyway as little more than a cover for
the theorists' own political or moral agenda) there should be talk along with
Posner about the concrete and relative advantages of choosing one over another.
However, such talk must be openly moral and political; there is no scientific or
factual way to finesse that responsibility and opportunity. Sadly, Posner is
pragmatic in the most unpragmatic of ways. Because he accepts much of the
contextual situation as given, he restricts himself to tinkering with present
arrangements and remains profoundly abstruse and rationalistic in his analysis:
'abstract universality' is ditched, only to be replaced with 'abstract particularity'.
There is little appreciation that legal reasoning operates in the real world of
historical struggle or of how law does (and does not) change.37 Giving the idea
of social practices a more political than ethical spin brings the operation of
power into the centre of debate; consensus (and therefore standards of persuasion
and justification) can be treated as imposed as much as chosen. In moving from
truth to usefulness, a thoroughly pragmatic jurisprudence does not set out to know
things as they really are

a

a

la Dworkin or to isolate a scientific criterion of usefulness

la Posner. In responding to the compelling question of what to do next,

both Dworkin and Posner answer with far too much certainty or confidence than

is good for them or for anyone else: knowledge and usefulness are not stable or
secure footings on which the houses of law can be safely constructed. A
Darwinian-informed

pragmatism

is much

less modest

and

much

more

experimental. And it is to an elaboration of such a perspective that we now
turn. In Darwinian terms, law is one more set of tools through which human
beings are struggling to cope with the contingent circumstances of their
environment and with the realization that these efforts, like the best-laid plans of
Robbie Burns' mice and men, often come to nought.

Between A Rock and A Watch
When Charles Darwin went to Christ's College at Cambridge University in 1827,
he stayed in the same rooms as had the former student and fellow, William Paley,
fifty years before. Although there is no reason to think that this was more than
a matter of curious coincidence, the lives of the two men share a certain
synchronicity. In completing his degree, the young Darwin was obliged to study
Paley's extensive writings. A theological scholar of some repute, he had been an
eloquent proponent of the socalled argument-by-design rejection of evolution.
Paley's central contention was that the sheer complexity of biological organisms,
especially humans, defied explanation as being the result of chance evolution rather
than deliberate design:

In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the
stone came to be there; I might possibly answer that, for anything I knew to the
contrary, it had lain there forever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the
absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it
should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of
the answer I had before given, that for anything I knew, the watch might have always

been there.38

Darwin was much taken by Paley's work and, in an important sense, spent
much of his life demonstrating why Paley's claims were false and that even the
most complex of biological creatures or designs required no designing hand or
orchestrating intent. However, the most complete refutation of Paley did not come
until 1986 when Richard Dawkins took on Paley fairly and squarely. Using
Paley's own examples, he showed how it was even more wondrous and aweinspiring that nature's intricate complexity should be the result of gradual and
insistent evolution over time than the draughtsmanship of a designing deity.
Emphasizing the unplanned, unconscious, and automatic processes of nature,
Dawkins concluded that:
natural selection . . . has no purpose in mind, . . . has no mind and no mind's eye, . . .
does not plan for the future, . . . has no vision, no foresight, no sight at all . . . [and,] if
it can be said to play the role of watchmaker in nature, it is the blind watchmaker.39

Darwin was vindicated. And there is no reason to assume that he would have
been anything but impressed and approving of Dawkins' efforts. Nevertheless,
while Dawkins' work did little more than further confirm and corroborate
Darwin's ideas, the extent to which Dawkins and others have been prepared to
push that claim has proved controversial. Not content with explaining the
evolution of all biological organisms in line with a Darwinian evolutionary
dynamic, they have made the audacious claim that the behaviour of such
organisms (again, especially that of humans) is entirely explicable in the same
terms. Whether

scavenging

for food or shopping for watches, whether

scrambling for sexual supremacy or reflecting on sexual mores, humans and other
organisms are striving to adapt to their environment and ensure the survival of
the fittest. This is a bold and unsettling claim that has considerable relevance to
the debate about the development and operation of the common law. Of course,

the power of a good idea is to be found in its limits as well as its depth. In this,
Darwinian evolution is no exception. What tends to divide Darwinians is less
the precise operation of an evolutionary dynamic, although there are competing
views over this issue, but the general scope of its applicability.
Probably the main bone of contention between the Darwinians and ultraDarwinians is the application of Darwin's ideas to human behaviour. 40 There is
general agreement that, because humans are a species, their creation and
development are readily explicable by the logic of Darwinian evolution. This does
not mean
that the existence of humans was inevitable or planned and nor does it mean
that their continued existence is guaranteed. Like dinosaurs and dodos, humans are
vulnerable to the extreme deprivations of their natural environment. This may be
so, and as legal writers we are ill-equipped to evaluate the notion. But we can
suggest some troubling points for at least the traditional understanding of
'evolution'. Unlike all other organisms (to date), humans have a greater and
more sophisticated capacity for conscious planning and for impacting the
environment in which they live; they manage to affect and shape their
environment as they are affected and shaped by it. Consequently, human
development is not entirely reactive or adaptive; people are able to exert a
powerful influence on some of the factors-notably, those that are emphasized in
'selection' or a notion of a naturally-occurring 'environment.'41 This means that
any attempt to reduce the study of human activity to familiarity with the same
evolutionary dynamic as works for fish and fowl may be ultimately unconvincing:
it may be futile to ask 'are humans evolving?' in the traditional sense.
A key question, therefore, for Darwinian adherents is how to account for
those human behaviours that are the result of conscious planning and intellectual
design-can they be brought within the explanatory provenance of a modified

Darwinian dynamic or are they outside its descriptive ambit and, therefore, a
challenge to its whole scientific status? One of those human processes is law
which, at bottom, is a collective human endeavour to cope with and control
human affairs, and perhaps even the world around us; it is an artefact, like
morality and psychology, that seeks to check as much as adapt to the
environmental forces which comprise its nurturing context. Accordingly, at the
heart of the intersection between evolution and law are the problematic claims
for the nature of human progress and the progress of human nature.
Biologists might safely limit their project to describing how evolution
works: but accounts of law cannot take the narrower scope, for their subject
matter is ethics, or politics if you will. To biology, it hardly seems necessary to
add the human elements of will, design and purpose (which some use
evolution to support) which are very likely not knowable entirely through
experiment or 'long catalogues of facts'. Since the first wave of social Darwinism,
this unknowability has been challenged or imputed in different ways by the
claims of sociobiology, law-and-biology, etc. In terms of the actual cause of
change in individuals and species, the prevailing doctrine in evolutionary
biology is clearly committed to the view that random change or chance errors in
replication at the genetic level actually cause variation in individuals. This
concept of change is at odds with most uses of the evolutionary metaphor in law
and works quite against the traditional directed idea of an evolutionary
narrative. As such, the exact correspondence of law and biology is not
supportable. Law does not have 'species' nor does change occur independent
of human endeavour, it is not directly subject to the theory of evolution or
its explanatory power, no matter at what level evolution operates. The only
plausible comparison between law and biology is in terms of relative analogy.
Because humans are perhaps the only beings that have been able to transform

their own environment so radically, it is not easy to claim that such behaviour
is 'selected' in the classical narrative sense so that there is a sense of directed
change; it is better seen as part of a more complex interplay between humanity
and its environment. If law is a social construct and human behaviour is
transformative of its context, there is a very different dynamic at work from
that of the traditional evolutionary metaphor.

Moreover, as well as its

troublesome naturalistic (i.e., explanatory power converts to predictive authority)
and

deterministic

tendencies

(i.e.,

genetic

or

behavioural

traits

are

predetermined), the evolutionary narrative also works equally badly the other
way by reducing law's ethical dimension to bare description; this is simply
another way of attempting to further the illusion that law is separate from
politics and to deny the force of the critical claim that 'law is politics'.
Saying this much may merely be accusing proponents of evolution in law of
making selective analogies or choosing poor metaphors, and to suggest how such
constructs are ultimately unpersuasive. But a sense of the broader challenges-the
accusations of vulgar reductionism, or thinly disguised theism, and even the
import of a measure of indeterminacy, as we have suggested above, have all led
to attempts to improve the model. The most theoretically interesting is probably
the latter, which has led, we suggest, to the analogies to various forms of
qualitative reasoning in other areas (including biology) that themselves try to cope
with levels of indeterminacy within deterministic systems. It is easy to see the
attractions for accounts of common law development.
Some efforts to overcome

some of these

debilitating

problems have

concentrated on developing a parallel and complementary process to Darwinian
accounts of biological change that can explain cultural development. For instance,
Jack Balkin has sought to provide an account of how shared understandings in
law grow and spread from one generation to another. Drawing on the work of

Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, he picks up on an understanding of natural
selection as a neutral, algorithmic process, applicable to an extremely wide range
of phenomena and capable of achieving immense feats by slow accumulation
over large extents of time and space. Balkin contends that, while basic
physiological information is contained in genes and is passed down through
reproduction to new generations, there are also 'memes' which play a similar
function to genes in facilitating the transmission of abstract ideas through cultural
exchange over time. He argues that all mental and cultural life, including law, is
adequately explainable by a mechanical Darwinian process of natural selection in
which genes and memes struggle for survival. Seeking to fuse concepts of
function in biology and meaning in philosophy, the theory utilizes adaptionism
as a fertile source of both biological and social explanations. Rejecting the notion
of any Panglossian tendency at work, Balkin asserts this evolutionary process is
less Darwinian than Lamarckian in that adaptation and variation occur in direct
response to the environment rather than as part of a contest between random
variations to fit better the environment. 42 In short, he offers a less assertive form
of autopoietic development using mimetic units. However, in attempting to
provide

a scientific basis for cultural evolution, from a political-ethical

perspective, Balkin manages to offer a process that is clinical and sterile in its
political content; his theory of ideology is all so neutral and comforting in
presenting the interaction between people and their social environment as relatively
benign and harmless. Moreover, the alleged analytical strength of this kind of ultraDarwinian theorizing runs out at the very point at which it might be thought to be
most needed; the Panglossian tendency cannot be so easily cabined or contained.
Like other homological approaches, such an approach rests (consciously or
unconsciously) on the applicability of forms of measurement of problems within
the home fields (biology, sociology, even epidemiology) within the 'legal fields'.

There are a couple of initial objections to these explanations of change and
development when applied to law. The first is that, like the traditional
evolutionary narrative, the method may risk serious misapplication outside the
'home' discipline or problem. The applications of 'chaos theory' or 'catastrophe
theory' are a couple of examples with filiations in biology. Aside from their
nomenclatural problems (they are really misnomers in the common sense of those
words), these two theories are models that select a fact or two out of a large
tangle of them, and suggest patterns of subordinate facts, much in the way
evolution does. They are not predictive or determinative, merely suggestive of
an explanation, a mathematical guess at a pattern to look for. They provide, in
use, a form of very formal contingent closure to a proposition, but (we contend)
there is not an overriding theoretical or evidential reason to prefer this form of
proof over any other. Additionally, the suite of propositions to which they may
be applied is probably limited, and they do not appear (on our cursory reading)
to be generalizable to fields such as ethics or even something called 'law and
biology', notwithstanding attempts to characterize, say, prison mutinies as
'dissipative systems' obeying the contours of Rene Thom's catastrophe theory, or
applications of Lorenz's 'sensitivity to initial conditions' to literary theory. Our
main interest is the attraction these forms of qualitative reasoning-those coping
with some level of indeterminacy-have for legal theorists.
At any rate, they may have another related but more serious limitation: they
are descriptive models, and like much economic analysis, they have very little to
say, strictly speaking, about how law, an ethical inquiry, will or ought to
develop. If we take law seriously as an ethical enterprise, we do ourselves a
disservice to then re-invent (reveal?) patterns of human nature that law must
obey. Yet these models are employed as a sort of rhetorical proof, resplendent
with the nomenclature of higher mathematics, that suggest this very step, as we

have argued at length above. The use of these analogies and metaphors is not
limited use, and they contain understandably attractive qualities to those writing
about common law problems.43 But they are ultimately unpersuasive of the
'evolution' of common law.
However, to resist the ambitious claims of these ultra-Darwinian theorists does not
mean that a Darwinian explanation has no role to play in explaining and understanding
legal development. To challenge cultural determinism is not to align oneself with the
genetic determinists and to reject socio-biology is not to subscribe to a Creationist
creed. Too often, what begin as correctives to the excesses of existing theories
become full-blown and equally excessive alternative theories. Dworkin is surely right
when he insists that 'moral reflection, through various layers of justificatory ascent
including the philosophical, is as much a part of human nature as anything else'.44
Yet, to deny the universalistic and deterministic claims of a pseudo-scientific
approach to law and adjudication is not equivalent to taking the position that
philosophy and justificatory ascent are equally determinative or comprehensive in
their description of law. Even if judges did all engage in such heady flights, there is
no reason to think that the resulting abstraction would be congruent or coherent.
Indeed, the assertion that there is some presence or generation of Purpose(s) from
within the legal system itself is very problematic. Even assuming that law can be
described as something organically distinct from other practices of political human
behaviour, the phenomena described (i.e., laws, doctrines, cases, etc.) are actually
characterized as passive or automated entities. However, as soon as the analysis shifts
to self-movement, learning, and self-reflexivity, the entity has itself assumed to have
some form of active life. In rhetorical terms, there has been a slippage from scene
to agent and from description to purpose in which the system itself is imbued with a
definite normative content. From that point on, it is all too quickly and easily
presumed that uniform behaviour gets treated as evidence of a unity or harmony of

interests. This becomes an invisible hand in classical economics, is generalized and
made more systematic as class interests in Marxian economics, and manifests as
normative coherence in liberal jurisprudence. (We note here that in this sense Smith
was the original author of the ‘communistic fiction’).
But of course, ascribing a 'harmony of interests' does not do the work of
explaining transformation in law without importing an operating principle of
agency from outside. In fact, these systemic narratives of evolution attempt to
have it both ways in their insistence that agency and context combine to
produce change: the organism of law becomes depicted as something more than a
passive body of conjoined phenomena, but not sufficiently active or political to
be an integrated part of the larger political world.
The whole idea of law 'working itself pure' is anathema to any kind of
evolutionary account of law. Even under the most modest and non-systemic
account, evolution is most certainly not a purifying process in which deviant
forms are eliminated so that a species' true being can assert itself. Also, such a
jurisprudential account runs up against the problem that, if law became perfectly
adapted to its social and philosophical role, any change in the environment
would immediately ensure that law was unsuited and unresponsive to challenges
that occurred. As such, if the idea of law 'working itself pure' is to have any
validity or bite, it must rest on a particular theory of social development-that
society will also reach a point of political equilibrium in which social tensions are
in both philosophical and practical harmony-that is both fantastical and
reactionary. Such assumptions place Legal Creationists in the dubious camp of
end-of-history prognosticators like Francis Fukuyama who maintain that 'there is
a fundamental process at work that dictates a common evolutionary patent for

all human societies-in short, something like a universal History of mankind in
the direction of liberal democracy.'45 Hegel never had such strange bedfellows:

but if that is a serious proposition, then we might legitimately wonder how it
is to be proved in so open a system. The contingent closure of the evolutionary
narrative provides a handy argument. Ironically, in rejecting the merit of a
Darwinian approach to legal and political development, these liberal democrats
rely on exactly the same kind of evolutionary trope in explaining and
justifying the working-pure character of law and social institutions. As such, the
denial of Darwinian insights' relevance to legal and social development is both
contradictory and confusing.
Accordingly, the challenge for those who insist upon the pertinence of
Darwinian evolutionary insights for law is to include and explain the role that such
'moral reflection' plays in human behaviour and social development generally.
What people do is affected by what people think they are doing. Unlike with
other creatures in the rest of the natural world, humans are a species that has selfconsciousness and, therefore, can reflect upon the nature of its own doing. In this,
lawyers are no different from other social actors. To different extents and with
varying awareness, what lawyers do is affected by what it is that they think that
they are doing and what it is that they think that they ought to be doing.
Without some incorporation of that crucial element in any explanatory equation,
the effort to understand judicial practice and legal development will be found
wanting. Where we might say Darwinism is about variation and contingency, a
Dworkinian jurisprudence is about convergence and purification. Insofar as the
constraints on evolution are historical and environmental, behaviours only
change to the extent that the local context allows or requires. As one biologist
neatly captures the operation of the evolutionary dynamic, 'the archaic features of
life merely reveal its tortuous history, like the archaic features of human
language or common law.'46 Any effort to obscure or sidestep that history will fail
to capture an important dynamic in law's development. Rather than being on a

pre-assigned route to some exalted or transcendental state, the common law is
simply a continuing work-inprogress that is always moving, but never arriving and
that is always on the road to somewhere, but never getting anywhere in
particular. Perhaps what really demands explanation in the common law is not the
phenomenon of change, but the existence of stability.

A Modest Proposal
It has lately become the fashion (again) to marry a criticism with a proposal, no

matter what sort of progeny such a marriage may produce. Wishing to uphold
critical vows, and live by them, we offer some tentative thoughts about how we
might frame a discussion of change and development in the common law, with an
emphasis on location of change and development, and the very political and
contingent character of law.
The illusion of total command is maintained by a willingness to accept that the
environment will need to be respected. While it is true that law might 'evolve in
the direction of greater fit with its environment',47 there will always be a
productive tension between the law's notion of fit and the changing social,
political, and cultural make-up of that environment. In short, law will always be a
relatively open-ended and stylized form of politics in which 'anything might go'.
That 'anything' rarely does go is an indicator not of natural qualities to law, but
of persistently constructed constraints that need examining for relevance and
validity. This is arguably what law does, albeit imperfectly.
Even if law is understood as an adaptive process through which people mediate
the always contingent, usually contested, and often contradictory demands of
human living, there is no reason to think that it will have any great success.
Indeed, the very criteria for assessing success will be as contingent and

contested as the process itself. Whereas ultra-Darwinians are intent upon
demonstrating that almost all human behaviour can be explained as having its
roots and explanation in the biological adaptation to environmental conditions,
Gouldians insist that much human behaviour is maladapted and is likely to be the
unanticipated result of something which did have an adaptive function. In
short, the world is too contingent and complex to submit to such reductionist
accounts. Often, the answer to the ubiquitous question of 'what is the purpose of
X?' is 'nothing'. X developed as a by-product of some other adaptive change
and, as such, might or might not turn out to be more useful and lasting than the
initial adaptive change itself. Similar to the biological world, the legal world has
its share of maladaptation in that the good and the bad, the adaptive and the
maladaptive, can be packaged in a single unit (the Good-Bad) that must be taken
as a whole. Unlike the wishful thinking of many jurists, law may be closer to the
scenario of jerry-built morphology, second-best physiology, and makeshift
behaviour: 'the useless, the odd, the peculiar, the incongruous' are the 'signs of
history' that are as much part of the evolutionary narrative as any other and, if
excluded or marginalized, will entirely invalidate any account.48 In an open
system, it is probably impossible to bring all instances of the proof within the
proposition. It can only appear so.
As such, one consequence of this ought to be some recognition that there is no
one and even no optimal strategy for dealing with the biological or legal world
that can guarantee success. Also, in some configurations, the adaptionist
argument is so banal that it gets no further than the Creationist. Because
everything that does happen must happen, so to speak, it has no critical edge or
interesting force, and instead lulls us into a deeper dogmatic slumber. In our
appropriated Darwinian vocabulary, adaptation is a process of becoming rather
than a state of final optimality, because any reliance on the notion of perfect

optimality would undercut the constant dynamism at work in nature and pave
the way for the resurgence of Creationist thinking.
Knowledge of the 'how' of evolution does not mean that we are any more
likely to know or calculate what will happen next by way of predicting future
development or direction. Rather than grope vainly towards a theory of
everything for everywhere at every time, it is better to think of trying to draw
more pragmatic lessons from legal traditions, development, and change. Some
of the law and evolution paradigm does just this, subject to the criticisms we
have laid out here. The question 'what do we want law to be, and how has that
been achieved traditionally, in any given circumstance?' is a better focus than
'What is law's essential nature?' Of course, there can be workable theories of
development and change, even some level of prediction at a very local level and in
specific contexts, but the 'larger questions' might never be resolvable in any useful
or persuasive manner: the contingencies of social life, and our very limited
understanding of them, ensure that confidence or certainty in final solutions will
remain elusive. This is no bad thing. As Popper delightfully noted, 'there can
be no explanation which is not in need of a further explanation' .49 Or, to
express that in a way more salient to this essay, legal theory is never an answer
that can speak for itself: it all depends on the political context, which of
course always speaks out of both sides of its mouth and in a garbled accent.
In terms of law, therefore, it is important to grasp that an evolutionary
perspective is not about generating an agenda for change or a justification for
law's particular development. Instead, it is about developing an attitude or
approach to law that recommends, among other things, cultivating a healthy
scepticism about formulaic recipes for legal success, about simplistic notions of
legal progress, about the predictive power of so-called rational planning, about
the temptation of reductionist explanations, and about the sense that we are or

can ever be entirely on top of things, even if we are in the Hart Chair in Oxford.
Lawyers need to nurture situation-sense and practical savvy as much as
philosophical sophistication and abstract theorizing. Evolution talks in terms of
natural selection as being about solving problems, but it must not be forgotten
that it has nothing to tell us about the problems that will require solutions: this is
a crucial insight for law as well as certain stripes of evolutionists. In a
jurisprudential manner of speaking, common law judges offer up what they
believe to be the best answer to a problem out of a series of possible good
answers. However, in law as in biology, it remains the case that 'even if you
can build a bottle from which the desired genie emerges, you can't reduce the
genie to the bottle once it's out'.50 Nor, it can be added, is it possible to
understand what the genie is capable of doing without appreciating the origins of
the genie, its relation to the bottle, and the forces that brought it into play in
the first place.
As with much else, the relation between biology and human behaviour,
including theories about their relationship, is likely to be variable, complex, and
indirect. In an important sense, this tension in law constitutes one more corner of
the action in the familiar battle between 'nature' and 'nurture'. It is hard to
believe that it is an either/or choice. It is perhaps safer to suggest that it is a mix
of both which occurs in a contingent and intricate way.51 Accordingly, although
it might be tempting to dismiss all law-andbiology positions as vulgarly
reductionist or crass essentialism, it would be mistaken. While law's development
cannot be reduced to a simple evolutionary dynamic, this does not mean that
there are no evolutionary forces at work. The role of evolutionary factors will be
appropriately contingent and changeable. Viewed in this way, both Dworkin and
Posner can be understood as being right and wrong. They are right because their
accounts do offer robust insights into how the law is viewed, created, and

changed; they each have something to tell us about the dynamics of legal change
and judicial reasoning. But they are wrong in that they treat those helpful
insights as universal sagacity about the nature of law and adjudication. The kind
of non-foundationalist critique that we have offered is only partially concerned
with questioning the explanatory validity of law-and-economics

and law-and-

biology accounts, but is certainly troubled by normative or totalizing claims.
These accounts still may be invalid, or at least not useful models for legal
behaviour, but this is not to deny their attempts to understand it in a systematic
way. To the extent that these systems provide explanations of the development of
law and manage to avoid creating false notions of autonomy or positing internal
values to legal systems, they are useful projects that can indeed tell us something
about legal development and change. However, when so understood, they cease to
be the kind of foundationalist theories which both Dworkin and Posner offer, and
instead they become non-foundationalist projects.

Conclusion
In this essay we have not sought to assert the claim that evolution is applicable to
legal development. To be sure, law is a self-reflective process of rational
thinking, but it is far from reducible to an activity governed by a strict
philosophical discipline that is entirely internal to legal practice. All the talk
about grand purposes or guiding minds is pitched at such a high level of
generality that what they might or might not recommend in any particular
situation is almost impossible to predict. Or, to turn that around, the solution
to any particular problem can be interpreted in accordance with a variety of very
different, often competing, and occasionally contradictory ideals, each of which
can claim a plausible threshold purchase on the

extant

legal

materials.

Consequently, while law is undeniably a teleological enterprise in that judges act
with a purpose, the system as a whole cannot be said to have a directing mind
such that it moves forward in one direction as if pulled along toward a given
goal. Even the characterization of a 'harmony of interests' is problematic.
Indeed, after Darwin it has become possible to admit that 'humans have to dream
up the point of human life and cannot appeal to a non-human standard to
determine whether they have chosen wisely . . . [and that] the meaning of one
human life may have little to do with the meaning of any other human life, while
being none the worse for that'. 52 In law there are many theoretical possibilities,
but the actual decision made is as much about external circumstances as
anything else: principles prosper or perish not only by dint of their intellectual
merit, however that might be measured, or by ethical sophistication, but also by
their capacity to adapt to material conditions. Holmes' warning has been ignored,
especially by those evolutionary jurists who claim to follow in his intellectual
footsteps: 'we have evolution in this sphere of conscious thought and action no
less than in lower organic stages, but an evolution which must be studied in its
own field'.53
We have presented a brief metaphor for change and development in law, but
this is just an example to suggest other emphases in critical thinking. Ours is not
a claim that the common law is one thing or another. In particular, we do not
contend that the common law does or does not function and develop in line with
an evolutionary logic. The most that can be said is that, insofar as evolutionary
theory has anything to say about law (and it is entirely likely that it has very little
to say) it tends to support 'critical' rather than mainstream accounts of the common
law. By that, we mean that treating law as if it were susceptible to an evolutionary
explanation does not advance the jurisprudential cause of those who insist on
claiming a certain autonomy, simplicity, systemization, and directionality to law's

development.

Far

from it: if anything, viewing law through the lens of

evolutionary theory offers some support to the central critical claims that 'law is
politics' and that the nature of that connection is unpredictable and contingent:
law's operation and practice simply will not conform to a reductionist and
predictive algorithm. The salutary lesson of the evolution debate is that the best
story is the one that weaves together lots of different threads in a quilt which is
as complex and as complementary as circumstances allow; there is no one set of
simple rules that can capture or explain the complexity and contingency of life.
Indeed, in a lesson that is singularly pertinent to law, it is stability or stasis that is
to be explained, understood, and perhaps even justified.
Abandoning the solace of divine procreation ought not to be a cause for
despair or resignation. Instead, it might galvanize jurists into the realization that
'moral inquiry is our struggle, not nature's display'.54 And, insofar as law is one of
the main institutional sites and practices through which contemporary society
takes part in that struggle, lawyers and judges might accept their participation as
genuine surrogates for the democratic citizenry, not as false conduits for a
philosophical truth. Evolution is a responsibility, not a necessity. Neither the
Soapy Sams nor the Bulldogs of the jurisprudential world exhaust

the

possibilities for understanding law's development. We need both of them: one as a
hopeful reminder that we must strive to rise above the limitations of our own
predicament and interests, and the other as a sober caution that we are as much
beasts as gods. And much else besides.
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